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Abstract
We analyse how the concept of the ether, playing the role of absolute
space, is still present in physics. When the problem is considered in the
context of classical mechanics, we show that vestiges of absolute space
can be found in the standard presentation of inertial systems. We offer an
alternative –fully relational– definition of inertial systems which not only
eliminates the problem but it further shows that the equivalence principle
is just a particular consequence of the No Arbitrariness Principle. In terms
of Special Relativity, the non-existence of relative velocities implies a con-
structive contradiction (their existence is assumed in the construction).
The problem is inherited from Lorentz’ use of the ether, developed in his
interpretation of Maxwell’s electrodynamics. In summary, the velocities
in the Lorentz transformations must be considered velocities relative to
the ether (absolute space) if the theory is not to fall apart for being incon-
sistent. We discuss the relevance of the phenomenological map, and how
previous works have failed to acknowledge that the consistency problem
is not in the exposed part of the theory but in the supporting phenomen-
ological map which, rather than being constructed anew, it transports
concepts of classical mechanics by habit, without revising their validity in
the context of Special Relativity.
1 Introduction
The construction of physics requires to go from the observable to the ideas,
often represented in mathematical language, and to return to the observations
from theoretically elaborated ideas. The mapping from observations into ideas
is the process of ideation [Husserl, 1983] and it is associated with simple and
philosophical intuition. There is then a phenomenological projection, Π, (we
will call: ideation) in which observations are stripped of particularities that are
regarded as irrelevant in answering the questions to be addressed. There exists
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a lift, Γ, as well; that goes from mathematics to new and old observations (call
it interpretation). Between ideation and interpretation there are two required
consistency conditions
Γ ◦Π = Idobs (1)
Π ◦ Γ = Idmath
The first relation says that the interpretation of what was ideated must be the
originally observed and the second that a new ideation of interpreted symbols
must return the original symbols. These phenomenological pairs of maps have
not been studied in any extent as far a we know except for [Margenau and Mould,
1957, Dingle, 1960] where the relevance of the “rule of correspondence” is recog-
nised, although no further progress was done on the subject. It is relevant to
notice that the present strict view was followed in the development of phys-
ics well into the XIX century. A turning point takes place when Hertz [Hertz,
1893] introduced free interpretation to make room for his form of understand-
ing (the bild conception [D’Agostino, 2004]). Free interpretation became the
dominant approach at the beginning of the XX century. Under Hertz’ point of
view, equations can be detached from the production process and reinterpreted
in several different forms. For what concerns to this work, Einstein [Einstein,
1905] proceeds in a similar way. Such epistemological shift leaves then room for
inconsistencies.
A second epistemological change was proposed by Poincaré. Poincaré sought
a new foundation of physics based on axioms [Poincaré, 1913a], for Poincaré,
the old physics played the role of provider of fundamental beliefs which had
to become axioms to make further progress possible. This is, the habits of
the trained physicist took the place of intuition in the foundation of physics.
It is in this context that Poincaré introduces the Principle of Relativity as a
fundamental belief supported by habit.
Hertz’ and Poincaré’s contributions are both in the direction of (possibly)
increasing irrationality in physics. Habits cannot be equated to intuition, much
less to Husserl’s philosophical intuition. Moreover, to detach the concept from
the conceptualisation is to render it void, superficial, mere opinion [Hegel, 2001].
We will first address (Section 2) some basic requirements imposed by intu-
ition on the concept of space, requirements that must be satisfied for otherwise
the concept becomes devoid of meaning, this is, it becomes metaphysical.
Poincaré’s Principle of relativity is a weak (intuited) form of a stronger and
more demanding principle: the no-arbitrariness principle (NAP). The principle
states that no knowledge of Nature depends on arbitrary decisions, and was
recently discussed in [Solari and Natiello, 2018]. Resigning this principle, i.e.,
admitting arbitrariness as a basic ingredient, is indeed an obstacle in the quest
for understanding Nature. The principle delimits the conditions with which
knowledge about Nature is to develop. As such, it is prior to physics and ex-
perience and it cannot be questioned empirically. The demand for objectivity
in our understanding directs us to reject arbitrary practices. However, if it
were not possible to achieve a full exclusion of arbitrariness, we must make sure
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that arbitrariness becomes irrelevant when answering valid questions regarding
Nature. In [Solari and Natiello, 2018], the notions of space and time were de-
veloped elaborating the concepts of permanence and change. Starting from the
subjective intuitive notion of space we proposed the existence of inertial frames.
Further, a relational formulation of Newtonian mechanics was presented, indic-
ating that absolute space was not fundamental to Newton’s theory. In this work
we develop the notion of inertial frame in a fully relational way. We will further
elaborate about the concept of space from this perspective in Section 2 We will
show in that section how the classical concept of space emerges in this context.
Next (Section (3)), we attempt to perform the same task using Minkowski’s
space. We show that an inconsistency appears violating (1) and furthermore,
that NAP is violated as well.
We show that the way out of these problems is to acknowledge that the
velocities involved in Lorentz transformations are to be regarded as velocities
relative to the ether as originally proposed by Lorentz. This is, we must assume
the existence of absolute space. However, the standard use of Special Relativ-
ity (SR) corresponds to relational velocities between source and detector such
as in the measurement of Doppler shifts. In experiments where changes in a
body (source) are followed with delay by changes in other bodies (receptors) a
description centred at the source takes a natural special character, as Faraday
originally suggested [p. 447, Faraday, 1855].
2 The perception of space and the phenomenolo-
gical map
The phenomenological map translating observations and relations between ob-
servations and symbols is not completely free of conditions. While we usually
leave this map to intuition, it can be put to some extent under the supervision
of reason, this is, it can be addressed by philosophical intuition. What is of
fundamental relevance here is the notion of velocity.
To address the notion of velocity we need to address first the notion of
spatial relations. Take e.g., a look at the garden. Leave aside (project out) the
moving leaves and birds, and consider those elements that impress us as keeping
a constant relation among them. We seek for a universal instruction to move
around the garden. We then identify the elements with labels, i ∈ [1 . . .N ] and
summarise the instruction of “going from i to j” as xij . Any moving instruction
can be given as a concatenation of moving instructions, this is the most essential
condition of space,
xij + xjk = xik
xij + xjj = xij (2)
xjj ≡ 0
xij = −xji
We then realise that xij = xij + xjj since xjj is the instruction for remaining
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at the locus of j, or just “do nothing”. We call xjj the neutral element, 0 ≡ xjj .
The last line in (2) express the perceived fact that the outcome of staying in
one place is the same as going from that place to another and returning. Thus,
returning becomes the inverse operation of going: xij = −xji.
This is enough for our purposes. We need now to introduce velocities, and
hence, we need to introduce change, or its abstract form, time (that time is
abstract form of change was already known to Aristotle [Aristotle, 1994–2010]).
Our observations may indicate/suggest that the organisation of the garden is not
always the same, perhaps because we want to explain where a bird is feeding in
the garden. We have then decided that there are things that, for our purposes,
are permanent (do not change) such as trunks and stones as well as birds. But
the birds cannot be located with “old instructions”, the location instructions
have to be updated as a function of other perceived changes. Each observer
may have his own clock, so we write tS and understand that all the instructions
in Eq. 2 were given for a determined time:
xij(tS) + xjk(tS) = xik(tS)
xij(tS) + xjj(tS) = xij(tS)
xjj(tS) ≡ 0
xij(tS) = −xji(tS)
We finally consider the relation between the rate of change our clock and the
rate of change of relative positions,
vij(tS , δ) ≡
xij(tS + δ)− xij(tS)
(tS + δ)− tS
It follows immediately that
vij(tS , δ) + vjk(tS , δ) = vik(tS , δ)
This is, whatever the clock is, the composition law between velocities must be
the same that the composition law of the space.
Confronted with this fact, the trained physicist may want to elude its con-
sequences by denying the correctness of the construction, since the request on
velocities can be seen by the trained eye as contradicting the transmitted know-
ledge regarding the addition of velocities in SR. She/he is certainly welcome to
do it, but under two restrictions: (a) a substitute phenomenological map must
be provided, since otherwise physics would not talk about that what is perceived
as real, but it will rather be a formal exercise. And, (b) under the new concep-
tualisation the adoption of concepts previously learned by habit or arising from
any kind of social complicity must be banned, since habit or social complicity
only exist within the original construction now being doomed as incorrect.
2.1 Descartes’ mathematisation of space
The Cartesian view is always the view of an observer, the view that matches
our intuitive construction, namely an extrinsic view. In Descartes’ method,
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directions and distances are used instead of giving instructions to move around
the garden based upon landmarks. Thus, the instruction that was “walk from i
to j, xij” becomes “from i walk x steps in the direction eˆij to j”, that we annotate
xij = eˆijx. If we now agree to consider only the path from a given reference
position (the position of “ego”), all paths consist in concatenations of this kind
of instructions. Our intuition tell us more, it tells us that there are only three
independent directions, at least as much as we can perceive. Therefore, the
space is three dimensional and the mathematical construct is Cartesian space,
which not only inherits the rules developed for the concatenation of instructions,
but adds new rules based on intuition, such as xeˆ + x′eˆ′ = x′eˆ′ + xeˆ (addition
is commutative) and the other rules of vector algebra.
2.2 Subjective and relational spaces
Newtonian mechanics [Newton, 1687] was originally formulated resting on the
notion of absolute space. Already with Leibniz the alternative idea of a relational
space arose, i.e., a space free of the arbitrariness of an extrinsic reference. How
do we construct an intrinsic view (i.e., without external observers)?
Individual subjective spaces contain the arbitrariness of the choice of origin
and the choice of references, but “what is real presents characters that are en-
tirely independent of our opinions about them” [Peirce, 1955, p. 18]. This is,
the Cartesian space is not real. In contrast, relational constructions as those
like xij we used to introduce this discussion, stand their chance of being real.
Yet, the Cartesian view is not completely arbitrary because all arbitrary spaces
that we can produce map into each other in a one-to-one form. Thus, the
observations in one space need only to be translated into the observations in
another space (characterised by different arbitrariness). We say that the de-
scriptions are intersubjective. When the differences between subjective spaces
correspond to arbitrary elections that influence the description in a systematic
form, as it is the case of the choice of origin and the choice of directions of refer-
ence, the set of transformations relating the different descriptions must satisfy
conditions of consistency that allow us to move in the set of arbitrary descrip-
tions without contradictions. This is the core meaning of the No Arbitrariness
Principle (NAP) [Solari and Natiello, 2018], in short: the set of transformations
associated to arbitrary decisions must form a group. Actually, considering it in
finer detail, there is a group associated with each subset of equivalent arbitrary
decisions, this is: a group for the election of reference point, a group for the
election of reference directions, and so on.
If the Cartesian space for N bodies corresponds to R3Nand the group of
transformations between arbitrary representations (after restricting the choice
of directions to orthogonal directions) is E(3) = ISO(3) = SO(3)⋉R3, then the
real space is what results of modding out the arbitrariness: R3N/
(
SO(3)⋉R3
)
,
this is a point for N = 1, the real line for N = 2 and only for N ≥ 3 it acquires
the characteristics we intuitively assign to relational space by removing from
the subjective space R3N a global orientation and the position of the centre of
mass (for example).
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2.3 Inertial frames
We look for the view of an inertial frame considered separately from other things.
We begin by considering one body alone in a 3-dimensional, 3d, universe.
For such a body, relative space makes no sense at all. There is nothing else
available to consider e.g., relative positions. When we consider two bodies, only
a one dimensional universe is conceivable. The distance between the two bodies
is the only possibility for geometric change. The only conceivable direction is
that from one body to the other.
When we consider three bodies, a distinct difference arises. Let i, j ∈ (1, 2, 3).
We have the relations xij (oriented distances) and we can consider a large num-
ber of different vectors, e.g. the set {xij , dxij = xij(tS + δ) − xij(tS)} (even
before formalisation the latter represents a difference between two situations).
In a three dimensional space those vectors are not completely arbitrary: some
internal relations will become explicit. We are now in the position of considering
inertial systems, except under singular circumstances. We set
eˆij =
{
xij
|xij |
if d
dtS
xij = 0
vij
|vij |
if d
dtS
xij ≡ vij 6= 0
where vij = limδ→0 vij(ts, δ). Notice that in the absence of a mathematically
defined vector space, the derivation symbols d
dt
indicate a quotient between
perceived changes (for some fixed value of δ). The numerator refers to the
perception we call position and velocity and the denominator is any other kind
of change used as reference, its abstract form being time, hence called dtS , still
allowing for clocks of different systems to be non synchronised. The conditions
dxij = 0 and dvij = 0 are ultimately a subjective perception of the observer and
as such they introduce subjectivity in the description. It is this decision made
by the subject what creates the space that can be mathematically represented.
Definition 1. Two bodies are relatively inertial if there exists a reference frame,
a constant vector a, and a scalar b such that
db
dtS
is constant and
eˆij × (xij × eˆij) = a
eˆij · xij = b
d
dtS
eˆij = 0
where we always have
xij = a+ beˆij
If we force the inertial system to have a reference point in the relatively inertial
set, we then get the standard definition of inertial system. In such a case,
the study of inertial systems becomes a self-referencing approach. Thus, the
standard view of inertial frames is the one we have when we cannot remove the
observer from the scene. It is indeed a view much closer to our intuition.
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Definition 2. The reference frame of 1is called “inertial frame”.
Lemma 3. The inertial frames referring to a set of relatively inertial bodies
have as group of arbitrariness the translations (which may be time dependent)
and the (time independent) rotations composed as a semi-direct product group.
Proof. The instantaneous relative position ofN bodies is invariant under ISO(3)
as explained in Subsection 2.2. With relative positions, the arbitrariness of the
origin of coordinates cancels out even when it changes as a function of time. In
contrast, a change in the arbitrary choice of orthogonal directions of reference
as a function of time will make d
dtS
eˆij 6= 0 in the definition 1, hence it will break
the concept of relatively inertial set.
The introduction of inertial sets deserves a detailed discussion. In sub-
section 2.2 we introduced the instantaneous space for the description of the
relational problem of N bodies. Starting from subjective space, R3N , we ar-
rived to a relational space where the orbits of the points by the action of the
group E(3) = ISO(3) were identified, this is: R3N/E(3). The description of
the evolution in time in the relational space is then represented by a func-
tion of time, R, into R3N/E(3). Thus, each trajectory is given by a function
F (t) : R 7→
(
R
3N/E(3)
)
and the set of functions will be called F . The definition
1 uses relative positions, xij , which are invariant under changes of the origin
of the (subjective) coordinates, hence, these mathematical objects are invariant
under the action of T (3), the group of translations, and only rotations in E(3)
may change them. Then, from the original group of arbitrariness, E(3), we are
left with the effective action of E(3)/T (3) ∼ SO(3) (a result that can be intuited
as well). Since we have to make such a choice for every time when considering
a trajectory, the group of arbitrariness associated to the set {xij(t)} consists
of (continuous and twice differentiable) time-dependent rotations. Continuity
and differentiability is requested because we have to deal with velocities in the
definition. Because the translation of the subjective origin of coordinates does
not intervene in the definition of the inertial set and inertial frame, we can allow
any arbitrariness to such a collective translation.
The standard introduction of inertial frames is made in terms of subject-
ive spaces by selecting one such reference system in which the N bodies are
described as having coordinates xi(t) = xi(0) + vit. This view is restrictive
in excess and it is equivalent to arbitrarily adding an extra body, name it 0,
representing the origin of coordinates. Thus, the set of relatively inertial bodies
is augmented in one, and the positions are xi(t) ≡ x0i(t). The transformations
among inertial frames in the standard setting, the Galilean group, arise as a
consequence of this arbitrary restriction. This extra arbitrariness will have to
be compensated later (patched) with a new axiom, the “equivalence principle”.
Remark 4. The inertial class is larger that the class usually considered as in-
ertial, because it contains accelerated systems as those considered in Einstein’s
“equivalence principle” (stating the “complete physical equivalence of a gravita-
tional field and a corresponding acceleration of the reference system”[Einstein,
1907]) and beyond them, any kind of global time-dependent displacement of the
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frame and the objects under study. The “equivalence principle” 1is then not an
independent principle but just a consequence of NAP and its derived concept
of relatively inertial.
Two separate sets of bodies can be inertial and yet no inertial frame may
be available for all the bodies to pertain to a relatively inertial set (i.e., they
belong in different equivalences classes of Lemma 3).
The meaning of inertial is that, if we are going to consider a set of bodies
as isolated from the rest of the universe, in the absence of interactions among
them we expect the set to be relatively inertial and a class of inertial frames
to exist. Any departure of the trajectory of the bodies making them not free,
i.e., breaking the relatively inertial condition, must be attributed to interactions
(reciprocal actions) among them.
Remark 5. Inertial frames are not equivalent to absolute space, they are a device
used to organise our description of the mechanical world.
Lemma 6. Relatively inertial is an equivalence relation i.e., a relation ∼ such
that for three bodies A,B,C it holds that A∼A, A∼B ⇒ B∼A, A∼B andB∼C ⇒
A∼C.
Proof. A ∼ A since whenever xii = 0 and for arbitrary eˆ we have a = 0 and
b = 0 in Definition 1. If a pair a, b exists such that A ∼ B it follows that B ∼ A
with the associated pair −a, b. The third relation follows from vector addition
rules. We have
xAB = a+ beˆAB
xBC = a
′ + b′eˆBC
xAC = xAB + xBC
= a+ a′ + beˆAB + b
′eˆBC
Further, beˆAB + b
′eˆBC = c + tS
(
db
dt
eˆAB +
db′
dt
eˆBC
)
, where c is some constant
vector and the constant quantity in parenthesis is either zero or some other
constant nonzero vector. In the latter case, letting λ = ||db
dt
eˆAB +
db′
dt
eˆBC || and
eˆAC =
1
λ
(
db
dtS
eˆAB +
db′
dt
eˆBC
)
we get xAC = (a+ a
′ + c) + λtS eˆAC .
1There exist references in the literature to a “weak equivalence principle” stating that
inertial mass is identical with gravitational mass. However, this statement is more a social
construction than a basic ingredient of mechanics. The concept of (linear) momentum –or
quantity-of-motion– is not directly intuited but rather ideated. It was first ideated by Newton,
who developed the concept of force as well. While the gravitational mass of a body is part of
our intuitions, the inertial mass is a later construction. The emergence of two concepts of mass
appears to be the outcome of a social process: The instruction of physics (i.e., to learn physics
passively rather than through personal (re)discovery). A consequence of passive learning is the
creation of habits. Subsequently, habits are confused with intuitions. In this way, the concept
of force was “naturalised” by habit (in the sense that forces are treated as observables, rather
than as meta-observables –ideated–). In this process, an inertial-mass appears, relating force
and acceleration. A detailed construction of mechanics [Solari and Natiello, 2018] shows that
the concept of inertial mass rests completely on the concept of gravitational mass. Therefore,
it makes no sense to distinguish them.
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The notion of inertial is associated to freedom, i.e., to not being subject to
the influence of other bodies in a persistent form, i.e., independence of other
bodies implies that the law of motion cannot make reference to any circumstance
of them [Solari and Natiello, 2018]. In turn, persistence requires the identific-
ation of something that is not changing, this is, a time derivative being zero.
The law of motion for two relatively inertial bodies must read
dxij
dtS
= φ(xij)
for some function φ of the relative coordinate, being independent of other bodies
and persistent. But the change must be independent of the proximity of the
companion body for, after all, they do not influence each other. Thus, φ cannot
depend on relative position and hence, φ(xij) = vij = const.
3 Special Relativity
The traditional presentation of SR rests on two explicit principles, namely the
relativity principle (the laws of physics are the same regarded from any inertial
reference frame) and the constancy of the velocity of light, C, regardless of the
movement of the source (as seen from any inertial system). Einstein [Einstein,
1905] presents and completes the Lorentz transformations between two systems
with (constant) relative velocity v, as the well-known Lorentz boosts. In their
general form, the boosts read:
TvX =
(
γv(x − vt) + (1− γv)vˆ × (x× vˆ), γv(t−
v · x
C2
)
)
=
(
γv ((x · vˆ) vˆ − vt) + vˆ × (x× vˆ), γv(t−
v · x
C2
)
)
with γ−1v =
√
1−
v2
C2
(Lorentz, Poincaré and Einstein worked out the special
case where the direction of v is aligned with eˆ1, for an orthogonal reference
system where x =
∑
3
i=1 xieˆi). Some additional specifications are not fully stated
but consistently used. We state them as claims, allowing for the possibility that
they may need improvement:
Claim 7. If vBA is the relative velocity of B with respect to A, then, reciprocally,
vAB = −vBA.
This claim appears explicitly in [Einstein, 1905]. Equivalently, vAB+ vBA =
0. Further,
Claim 8. If vBA is the relative velocity of B with respect to A, then B is
transformed from A by a Lorentz boost,
This claim appears on [Ch. 16, Vol. i, Feynman et al., 1965] (among other
places), where it is stated that the correct transformations between systems
moving with relative velocity v are Lorentz transformations) and
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Claim 9. For the addition of two velocities, the following law holds,
u⊕ v =
1
1 + u·v
C2
(
(u · vˆ) vˆ + v +
1
γv
vˆ × (u× vˆ)
)
where v is the velocity of an object in a given system S1,u is the velocity of S1
relative to another system S0 and u⊕v is the velocity of the object in system S0.
The law is proved in [Einstein, 1905] for collinear velocities, while the “general
form” is in e.g., [Jackson, 1962, p. 531, eq. 11.31] (the lhs is not explicitly
written by Jackson; the expression in the rhs might be interpreted from the
text as v ⊕ u, but this is unimportant for the sake of the argument).
Lorentz boosts do not form a group. Hence, the expected behaviour of
coordinate transformations as given by the intuitions of Classical Mechanics,
are not met. The following result summarises the situation:
Theorem 10. Claims 7, 8, 9 are inconsistent, i.e., the three claims together
cannot be generally valid.
Proof. Consider three bodies a, b, c with constant velocities u, v,−w relative to
a system S0. The velocities are the slope of the world-lines a = T (u)(0, 0, 0, t)
†
(i.e., the spatial components of a divided with the temporal coordinate), and
similarly for b and c. By Claims 7 and 8, world-lines a and b can be transformed
to the system at rest with c by a Lorentz transformation T (w), since they are
given in S0 and vcS0 = −w is known (and therefore vS0c = w). Hence, aw =
T (w)T (u)(0, 0, 0, t)† and bw = T (w)T (v)(0, 0, 0, t)
†. Except for the collinear
case, T (w)T (u) is not a Lorentz boost but a general element of the whole Poin-
caré group (also called the homogeneous Lorentz group; for the sake of the prob-
lem the group of 4× 4 transformation matrices P such that PM = MP , where
M denotes the Minkowski metric). We note on passing that Lorentz transform-
ations do not form a group. Instead, we have T (w)T (u) = T (w ⊕ u)R(w, u) 6=
T (w ⊕ u), for some non trivial 3 × 3 spatial rotation matrix R. Therefore, if
Claim 9 is true, then Claim 8 is false since R 6= Id and Claim 7 is false since from
the slope of aw it holds that w ⊕ u =
1
1 + w·u
C2
(
(w · uˆ) uˆ+ u+
1
γu
uˆ× (w × uˆ)
)
while u⊕ w =
1
1 + u·w
C2
(
(u · wˆ) wˆ + w +
1
γw
wˆ × (u× wˆ)
)
and their sum is nonzero
outside the exceptional case of collinearity, i.e., u×wˆ = 0. In fact, if there exists
a relative velocity, then Claim 8 is false independently of Claim 9, since there is
no X whatsoever such that T (w)T (u) = T (X) for non collinear w, u.
Moreover, the following results also hold:
Corollary 11. (No NAP class of inertial systems) If Claim 9 is true, then the
relative velocity between a and b depends on the observer.
Proof. The four-vector whose slope gives the velocity of b relative to a as seen by
the system c is T (−(w ⊕ u))bw = R(w, u)T (−u)T (v)(0, 0, 0, t)
†, while the same
relative velocity as seen by S0 is given by T (−u)b = T (−u)T (v)(0, 0, 0, t)
†.
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Hence, every observer w has a different opinion about the relative velocity
between a and b.
In other words, the description of motion does not comply with NAP. Fur-
ther,
Corollary 12. Relative velocity is not well defined.
Proof. If there exists a relative velocity, it is observer dependent, i.e., nothing
that relates exclusively to the involved bodies and it does not comply with the
phenomenological demand of reciprocity in Claim 7.
Finally, it is a quite remarkable issue that there exists no prescription in
SR to measure relative velocities from arbitrary inertial systems. The coordin-
ate transformations systematically assume that the velocities in some reference
frame S0 are given (known). Everything else arises by application of transform-
ation formulas, with no measurements involved. In other words,
Corollary 13. At most one system of reference relates to all others systems
moving with constant relative velocity v through Lorentz transformations.
This privileged system S0 is the absolute space. Only for the privileged
system, the bodies (and other reference systems) can be described as moving
relative to it with velocity v, with other reference frames oriented parallel to the
chosen frame in S0. Lorentz transformations [Lorentz, 1904] were constructed
having the ether as absolute reference, after adapting Maxwell equations to the
ether (this is, after disregarding Faraday’s insights and experiments on relative
motion). Fields, velocities and electromagnetic sources are described from this
reference. It is then not surprising that the ether is still present (in the form
of a privileged system), even if we restrain from using the word. Textbooks
will simply start by stating that a second system moves with velocity v with
respect to the initial one, leaving in oblivion that the specification is incomplete
except when one of the systems is Absolute Space. This habit corresponds with
our intuition rooted in classical mechanics. Since habit soon becomes invisible,
the difficult part of the critical thinking that is required to understand the
foundation of such claim is left for the student to perform without help: the
need of critical thinking is not even suggested.
3.1 The phenomenological map
The origin of the exposed inconsistency lies already in Einstein’s original paper
[Einstein, 1905]. Einstein makes clear the use of two postulates: (i) The principle
of relativity, that represents an habit developed along Newton’s mechanics (very
much in the same form of elevating habits to postulates proposed by Poincaré
[Poincaré, 1913b]) and (ii) the constancy of the velocity of light. We find on
Part I, Section 2,
velocity =
light path
time interval
11
Πφ
Γ
Theory
Theoretical
conclusions
Observations
New
observations
Figure 1: Phenomenological map, Π, theoretical elaboration φ and interpreta-
tion Γ. The red circuit shows how unexpected observations (failed predictions)
propagate “backwards”, forcing improvements on Π.
Since in classical mechanics both quantities in the quotient are independent
of the frame of reference (Galilean transformations are the result of this requisite,
see [Solari and Natiello, 2018]) there would be no need to postulate that such
velocity is constant. Yet, Einstein produces a construction (a characteristic rods-
and-clocks construction to avoid abstraction; resting upon habits) in which the
velocity of light transforms as subjective velocities do, i.e., light is assumed to
move body-like. This hypothesis is hidden. Hidden as well is the hypothesis
“there exists a (relative) velocity”. A few lines further we read “We now imagine
the axis of the rod lying along the axis of x of the stationary system of co-
ordinates, and that a uniform motion of parallel translation with velocity v
along the axis of x in the direction of increasing x is then imparted to the rod.”
The existence of the velocity v is not discussed, it rests on our daily exper-
ience and our training (habituation) as physicists. Hence, the existence of the
concept “velocity” is not considered an hypothesis. If we raise it to what it really
is, we find (as we just proved) that there is no theory unless we introduce the
ether, since a basic requirement of a theory is to be consistent.
The theoretical construction must be clarified. Figure 1 shows a basic sketch
of a theoretical construction. The phenomenological map Π (a projection) pro-
duces symbols and relations among symbols from observations. The map Π
cannot be mathematised and rests upon intuitions and the same can be said
about the interpretation Γ (a lift) that takes symbols into observables. Any the-
ory of the observable must specify these maps. Thus, if we say: A moves with
respect to B with velocity vAB we must indicate which observation is behind
the statement and since the statement makes no reference to any other thing
than A and B we must show that the construct is independent of the observer.
These are requirements of consistency that we have called NAP. Whenever new
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observations conflict with predictions in Γ, the conflict “propagates” back and
triggers an improvement or extension of Π with broader range of validity.
All the existing discussions (see for example [Mocanu, 1986, Ungar, 1988,
1989, Ungar et al., 2005]) with reference to the rotations R(u,w) have been
performed following a detailed inspection of φ missing that the problem is not
there but rather in the hidden maps. It is the phenomenological map what is
faulty.
4 Discussion
In terms of classical mechanics we have shown that it is possible to introduce
inertial frames and sets of inertial bodies without introducing an Absolute Space,
complementing the work already presented in [Solari and Natiello, 2018]. We
have also shown that the new approach includes a larger variety of reference
systems making the equivalence principle just a particular case of NAP and its
consequences.
We have highlighted the relevance of the phenomenological map as part of
a theory of the real. Its absence makes any formulation something less than a
theory. In discussing SR, we have indicated a severe and fundamental incon-
sistency in its formulation at this level, one that cannot be cured by analytic
reason, but requires critical thinking. The observed problem on the definition
of relative velocity has been known at least since 1914 [Silberstein, 1924]. It is
currently clear [Gilmore, 1974] that the elements of the Poincaré-Lorentz group
can in general be expressed through a coset decomposition as P = TR where
T is a Lorentz boost and R a rotation. However, the role of R in an expression
such as P = T (w)T (u) = T (w ⊕ u)R(w, u) and its role concerning conven-
tional (spatial) changes of coordinates is not the same. There is no conflict in
attaching meaning to the velocities, but the conflict arises when we attempt
to adscribe to R(w, u) (also called the Thomas rotation) the same meaning as
usual spatial rotations, since rotations have been considered from the beginning
as associated to the arbitrariness of selecting reference directions in space, which
is independent of relative motion. The conclusion is that the velocities in the
Lorentz transformation refer to a particular reference system, which was the
ether in Lorentz [Lorentz, 1904]. The ether faded away from physics texts by
(approximately) 1930.
When interpreting relativistic experimental results, such as the relativistic
Doppler effect [Kaivola et al., 1985, Mandelberg and Witten, 1962] it is not the
ether what plays the role of a privileged frame but rather the frame of the
emitting body. Certainly, the frame of the emitting body can be distinguished
from all other frames which detect the electromagnetic signal. The distinction
emitting vs. receiving is real, but the distinction among the frames of different
receptors is arbitrary. Thus, it is admissible that the transformations from the
frame of the source to the frame of a receiver could be different than those
that go from one receiver to another. This use of Special relativity is strictly
Electromagnetic (EM). The idea send us back to the liminal work by Faraday
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on “vibrating rays” [Faraday, 1855, p. 447].
The actual use of SR indicates that not all the frames are equivalent, the
equivalence is constructed only by considering that the light jumps from the
emitting body to space and then it travels body-like through space. The centre
of the conflict is this construct, call it substantialism, that imposes to the non-
observable (the actions) the description of the observable (the bodies). It has the
practical advantage of allowing for intuitions and habits in the form of analogies.
Its cost is that it may be fundamentally wrong as it does not follow from reason
but rather from our limitations [Natiello and Solari, 2019].
Historically, absolute space had been rejected by the early XIX century.
However, it returns to some extent with Maxwell 2. The position of Lorentz is
bolder. Although he writes “That we cannot speak about an absolute rest of
the aether, is self-evident; this expression would not even make sense” [Lorentz,
1895, p. 2], he subsequently adopts the ether as an absolute reference frame.
The materiality of the ether was a requisite for Lorentz. The view of Einstein
was different. For him [Einstein, 1924]: “It is usually believed that aether is for-
eign to Newtonian physics and that it was only the wave theory of light which
introduced the notion of an omnipresent medium influencing, and affected by,
physical phenomena. But this is not the case. Newtonian mechanics had its
‘aether’ in the sense indicated, albeit under the name ‘absolute space’ [...] The
Maxwell-Lorentz theory eventually influenced our view of the theoretical basis
to the extent that it led to the creation of the special theory of relativity. It
was recognised that the equations of electromagnetism did not, in fact, single
out one particular state of motion, but rather that, in accordance with these
equations, just as with those of classical mechanics, there exists an infinite
multitude of coordinate systems in mutually equivalent states of mo-
tion, providing the appropriate transformation formulas are used for the spatial
and temporal coordinates” (emphasis added). The highlighted statement is false
in SR, (Corollary 11: there is no inertial class, there is no equivalence relation).
Einstein legitimation of the “ether” rests on a constructive necessity of Newto-
nian mechanics, which, according to his view needs “absolute space”. In this
work we have shown that there is no such necessity. Absolute space is no more
than a pedagogical tool which simplifies the access to mechanics making a direct
connection with intuition.
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